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THE UNllEIlGIlAOUATE REVIEW
Charles Francis Adams,
Great Britain, and the
American Question in 1861
BY IAN DELAHANTY
Abstract
ile the South seceded from the Union throughout the
winter and spring of 1861, Americans prepared for what
would become the country's costliest war in terms of hu-
man sacrifice. Ordinary men became citizen-soldiers in
the blink of an eye, and Americans North and South rallied behind their respec-
tive causes for what many expected to be a brief conflict that would determine
the fate of America. Of course the war was nowhere near as brief as many
expected and eventually took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
The Civil War, however, did determine the fate of America; the conflict in many
ways has shaped the United States as we know it today and its consequences
may be seen throughout the nation. However, the fate of America was not de-
cided solely on its battlefields.
The world's greatest power of the mid-19th century, Great Britain, watched
America with an anxious eye in 1861. Americans at home and abroad were well
aware that should the British government side with the Confederacy, there was
a very real possibility that the Union could do nothing to prevent the separation
of the United States. With this in mind, the State Department serving under the
Lincoln administration immediately set out to ensure that Great Britain, should
it not see fit to side directly with the Union, remain a non-factor in the conflict.
Secretary of State William Seward firrnly believed that if the British government
could be kept form interfering in America's Civil War, the Union would crush
the Confederacy in a mere matter of time.
Thrust into this diplomatic struggle was the newly appointed American min-
ister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams. Adams's mission in Great Britain
was one of the most vital roles played by any member of the Union government
during the Civil War. The year 1861 was a particularly essential period with
regard to Anglo-American relations and British non-inter-
vention in the conflict. A series of trans-Atlantic feuds beset
the Union and British governments. threatening to not only
bring Great Britain closer towards recognizing the Confed-
eracy but also nearly bringing about a third conflict between
America and Great Britain. Fortunately for the Union, Ad-
ams proved an adept diplomat and did a great deal to pre-
serve relations between the two countries as well as prevent
the British government from intervening in America's do-
mestic difficulties.
The following are selected excerpts from the author's the-
sis, ~Charles Francis Adams, Great Britain, and the 'Ameri~
can Question' in 1861.& A brief background to Adams's role
is provided along with a concise summary of the issues that
divided America and Great Britain throughout 1861. The
majority of the article details the final incident of the year,
the Trent Affair, and demonstrates how Adams was able to
aid in preserving peaceful relations between the Union and
British governments. Finally, the conclusion offers a brief
recap of the entire thesis as well as a final word regarding
Adams's critical role as American minister to Great Britain
in 1861.
Adams, who had been elected to the thirty-sixth United
States Congress as a member of the House of Representa-
tives in 1859, heard many rumors in the immediate wake of
the 1860 presidential election that he might be selected as
a cabinet member. When Lincoln selected Adams's friend
and political ally Seward as secretary of state, Seward prom-
ised the Bostonian to do all he could to get Adams into the
cabinet as well, possibly in the Treasury. When such an
appointment did not materialize for Adams, Seward imme-
diately pressed Lincoln to give Adams the mission to Great
Britain. The newly appointed secretary realized that New
England was an ~important point" for Lincoln to consider
when handing out appointments, and since Adams had not
been included in the cabinet. the appointment as America's
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foremost minister abroad seemed fitting. Lincoln had in-
tended to send William L. Dayton to the Court of St. James
in London to serve as America's Minister to Great Britain.
However, having been convinced by Seward that Adams was
best suited for the duties and functions of America's repre-
sentative in London, Lincoln nominated Adams for the of-
fice on May 18. Adams was quickly confirmed by the Senate
and received the news of his selection on May 19. The news
of his father's selection "fell on our breakfast-table like a ver-
itable bomb-shell, scattering confusion and dismay~ wrote
Adams's son, Charles Francis lr. in his diary.
Adams took his nomination to be a sure sign of Secre-
tary of State Seward having a growing influence over the
President's decisions, something Adams saw to be a ufavor-
able sign:' Adams was a strong admirer of Seward and, as
his son Charles Francis Jr. later wrote, believed that Seward
was ~at his best- truly a statesman& during the secession cri-
sis oflate 1860 and early 1861. Thus it is not surprising to
find that, much the same as Seward, Adams believed that the
South's actions were merely bluster and idle threats. During
the winter of secession, both men steadfastly held to the no-
tion that a dormant Unionist sentiment existed within the
South. This so far silent bloc would allow a compromise
to be reached whereby the South would rejoin the Union,
slavery would be maintained where it was currently in place,
and any sort of conflict would be averted. Seward, along
with Postmaster General Francis P. Blair, had even argued
against the reinforcement of Fort Sumter because he did not
want to bring about a crisis that he believed could still be
avoided. Adams wholeheartedly agreed with Seward's ap-
proach to the Sumter crisis, and when the attempted rein-
forcement of Sumter resulted in the first shots of the Civil
War, the Bostonian was furious with Lincoln for not heeding
Seward's counsel.
Of course, Adams and Seward grossly overestimated the
amount of Unionist sentiment in the South. The two also se-
verely underestimated the extent to which Southerners were
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prepared to fight for their independence during the seces-
sion crisis of 1861. However. as Adams prepared to depart
for London during late March and early April, his trust in
Seward's ability as a statesman was unshaken and would re-
main so throughout Steward's tenure as secretary of state.
This trust in Seward. though put to the lest often in the year
1861, was vital to his task in Great Britain. While Adams
sometimes questioned and even altered Seward's [one or
use of language in the secretary's instructions to the Lon-
don legation. Adams was careful to always convey the actual
intent and overall message of them to Lord John Russell. In
many ways. the intense admiration that Adams displayed for
Seward while in London, coupled with the respect earned
by Adams himself within Palmerston's government. served
to create a grudging amicability in the relationship between
the foreign offices of America and Great Britain during the
Civil War.
As the Lincoln Administration came into office in early
March, 1861, it was faced with myriad challenges, not the
least of which was essentially creating a new government
from outgoing President James Buchanan's bureaucracy.
This meant that Lincoln and Seward had to select and have
confirmed by the Senate their selections for foreign minis-
ters. It also meant that the incoming administration was
forced to leave in place the outgoing ministers until their re-
placements had arrived, as was the case in Great Britain. In
a number ofcases these ministers were by no means loyal to
the newly elected president and several had gone so far as
to openly support the Confederacy while still stationed in
their respective nations. Needless to say, Secretary of State
Seward must have desired to have his new ministers situated
in their new missions as soon as possible...
Adams did not set foot in England until May 13, however,
and in the meantime the British government issued a decla-
ration, the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality, that recog-
nized both North and South as belligerents in a state of civil
war. Although the Palmerston ministry claimed to issue the
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Proclamation as purely a domestic measure, many within the
Union government (especially Seward) saw it as a hostile act
that would pave the way for full-fledged recognition of the
Confederacy. More importantly, the Proclamation was only
the first incident in a series of quarrels between the British
and Union governments throughout the spring, summer, and
autumn of 1861. Negotiations relating to neutral maritime
rights created an atmosphere of mistrUSt between Washing-
ton and london in May and June. Great Britain's need for
cotton caused the Palmerston ministry to complain bitterly
against the Union blockade and threatened to destroy rela-
tions between the two countries when rumors reached Eng-
land of the possibility that the Union would dose Southern
ports by decree in July and August. The results of the Battle
of Bull Run in late July led many in the British government to
seriously question the Union's ability to conquer the South
militarily. Backdoor negotiations between a British consul
stationed in Charleston, South Carolina and representatives
of the Confederate government were exposed to the Union
government in September and remained an outstanding is-
sue in Anglo-American relations throughout the faiL British
participation in a French-led intervention in Mexico caused
great apprehension amongst Northerners who viewed the
Mexican venture as an attempt to evade the Union blockade
and undertake direct contact with the Confederacy.
Throughout 1861, as Washington and London traded jabs
across the Atlantic over these issues, Charles Francis Adams
was working fervently in the British capital to prevent the
Palmerston ministry from interfering with the Union's war
effort. Adams often found himself having to tone down the
words of Secretary of State Seward lest the British govern-
ment take offense at Seward's often terse and brusque mes-
sages. The American minister to Great Britain did a superb
job of not only assuring that Great Britain avoided any in-
terference in the conflict, but also performed the vitally im-
portant task of keeping the relationship between American
and Great Britain a civil and working one. However, the
possibility of one incident igniting a powder keg in Anglo~
American relations hovered over Adams's work, threatening
to not only push Great Britain towards the Confederate cor-
ner but quite possibly foment a third war between America
and Great Britain. In early November, such an incident oc-
curred and at once threw into question British neutrality as
well as a nearly fifty year long peaceful relationship between
America and Great Britain. The months of November and
December provided Adams with his most formidable task of
the year and were the setting for one of America's most fate-
ful diplomatic events.
THE TRENT AFFAIR AND THE DRAMATIC
END TO 1861
During the fall of 1861, as Adams and Seward labored to
prevent a rupture in Anglo~American relations, the Confed·
erate State Department grew increasingly £rustrated by its
failed attempts to gain British or French recognition. The
cards seemed to be stacked in favor of the Confederacy.
Despite Britain's refusal to make the blockade an issue, the
fact remained that colton would have to be attained at some
point in the future. The blockade also threatened to cre-
ate an international incident between the Union and Great
Britain, as British men-of-war loomed ready to defend any
violation of the rights of British subjects in the North. Fur~
thermore, the Mexican expedition coupled with mounting
pressure in France for cotton left Napoleon pondering over
whether to open official diplomatic relations with the South.
Most importantly, the series of crises that had played out
between America and Great Britain ever since (and even be·
fore) Adams's arrival in London led policy makers through-
out the North to believe that it would not be long before
Great Britain bestowed recognition upon the Confederacy.
The Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality, Declaration of Paris
negotiations, blockade and port closures debates, results of
Bull Run, Bunch-affair, and British participation in the Mexi-
can intervention had all served to create a great deal of mis~
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trust and misapprehension on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet
in spite of all these issues, Great Britain, up to November,
had maintained its pledge to remain strictly neutral in the
contest between the Union and the Confederacy.
It is not surprising, then, that the Davis administration
in Richmond decided to dispatch a new diplomatic team to
Great Britain and France in the hopes that it would have more
success than the Yancey-Mann-Rost trio which had received
a lukewarm reception in May. Davis, along with Confeder-
ate Secretary of State R.M.T. Hunter, selected James Mason
and John Slidell to head to London and Paris respectively in
order to accomplish what their predecessors had not: rec-
ognition of the Confederacy by the powers of Europe. The
two men were appointed in early September and were pre-
pared to depart from Charleston in early October with their
new diplomatic instructions in hand. After calculating how
best to go about evading the blockading squadron that layoff
Charleston's harbor, Mason, Slidell, each man's secretary, and
Slidell's family departed on the newly renamed Theodora on
the night of October II and by October 14 arrived at Nas-
sau in the Bahamas. Before arriving ashore, however, the
Confederate envoys learned that a British mail packer was
to leave Havana, Cuba that would be able to connect them
to Southampton, England. Although they did not arrive in
time to catch the already departed British steamer, Mason
and Slidell were comforted in the knowledge that they were
now under the protection of a foreign flag. The two men and
their secretaries thus awaited the arrival of another vessel
that could take them to their destination in England.
By the end of October, Mason and Slidell were growing
weary of their stay in Havana, where they found the heat to
be unbearable, despite the warm welcome they had received
in the city. So they .....ere pleased to learn that a British mail
packer, the Trent, would be able to sail them to St. Thomas,
where they could be transferred to another steamer sailing
for England and arrive at their destination on November 28.
The travel plans of the Confederate envoys were not a very
allDGEWATEI STATE COLLEGE
'24
well kept secret, however. and fell into the hands of Captain
Charles Wilkes, commander of me U.S.S. San lacineto who
was supposed to be taking his ship back to Philadelphia (or
repairs after having sailed the African coast for a month in
search of Confederate privateers. Wilkes made the fateful
decision to try and intercept the Trent and take the Con-
federate emissaries on board prisoners as contraband of war
along with seizing the ship itself for adjudication in a prize
court. When, on November 8. the San Jacincto spotted the
Trent, Wilkes ordered a shot to be fired across the bow of
the British vessel. The mail packet kept on going, however,
and Wilkes ordered a second shot that exploded much closer
than the first had. stopping the Trent immediately. A board-
ing party from the San Jacineta was sent on board the Trent
and announced its intention to capture Mason and Slidell
as well as their secretaries. After a few meek attempts at
resistance, the aforementioned men accepted their arrest
and went somberly on board the San Jacincto where Cap-
tain Wilkes greeted them. The Captain was persuaded by
Lieutenant D.M. Fairfax to forgo taking the Trent as a prize
because doing so would deplete the San Jacincto's crew, and
the two ships parted ways with the Confederate emissaries
on board the Union vessel. Wilkes, by not leaving a prize
crew on board the Trent, would eventually discover that
he had made a grievous error and had lost all claims to a
legal seizure. However, that was in the future, and as the
San Jacincto sailed north, the Captain was overjoyed with
his capture.
News of \Vilkes's exploits did not reach Washington un-
til over a week after the capture of Mason and Slidell. Ly-
ons first wrote to Russell on the subject on November 18,
although he could only inform the foreign secretary that
Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries, had been captured
and taken as prisoners from the British mail packet Trent.
The following day, Lyons apprised his superior in London
on what position he planned to take over the Trent matter
in Washington (which, in fact, was none). "I feel that the
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only proper and prudent course; Lyons wrote to Russell, "is
to wait for the orders which Your Lordship will give with a
complete knowledge of the whole case.· The British minis-
ter to America, however, could not help but notice the "great
exultation" exhibited in the Northern press over the capture
of the Confederate envoys and believed that this was part.ly
due to the fact that Mason and Slidell had been taken from a
British ship. Lyons, who at times was prone to exaggeration
in his dispatches to the British foreign secretary Russell, was
not placing any undue emphaSis on the joy exuded through-
out the Union over the situation. When Wilkes arrived in
Boston on November 24 with Mason and Slidell aboard, he
was given a banquet at the Revere House during which many
prominent lawyers and politicians rushed to congratulate the
Captain of the San Jacincto and defended his actions as hav-
ing been entirely legal. Navy Secretary Gideon Welles was
among the first to offer WlIkes congratulations and the Unit-
ed States Congress eventually saw it fit to award the Captain
a gold medal of honor for his actions of November 8.
Adams received the news of the Trent situation while vis-
iting a British acquaintance's countryside home. A telegraph
from Adams's secretary at the legation, Benjamin Moran,
was handed to the American minister to Great Britain just
as he was about to head out on a trip to see some of the local
ruins. "The consequences necessarily rose up vividly at once
in my mind," Adams recorded in his diary that night. While
ack.nowledging that Wilkes's actions were possibly "justified
in the doctrines of Great Britain; Adams believed that this
would "scarcely make up for the loss of popular sympathy in
England." Although the news understandably shocked Ad-
ams, both he and the Palmerston ministry were well aware
of the possibility that an American vessel would try and cap-
ture the Confederate envoys. For the British government
knew of Mason and Slidell's expected arrival in November
just as much as the Lincoln administration was aware of the
envoys' departure from Charleston in mid-October. On
Tuesday, November 12, the prime minister had summoned
Adams to a meeting at his Cambridge House in Piccadilly.
After greeting Adams in a "very cordial and frank· manner,
Palmerston immediately got to the substance of the meet-
ing. The aging British statesman had been "made anxious·
over reports of a United States naval vessel, the James Adger,
sitting outside English port of Southampton that was pur-
portedly there in order to intercept the Confederate envoys
then on their way to London. Palmerston told Adams that
the Captain of the James Adger, "having got gloriously drunk
on Brandy on Sunday; was set up at the mouth of the river
"as if on watch." While not pretending to know the legal pre-
text for the vessel's right to take Mason and Slidell prison-
ers, the prime minister believed that such an action would
be highly unfavorable to America's image in Great Britain.
Furthermore, Palmerston believed it to "surely be of no con-
sequence whether one or two more men were added to the
two or three who had already been so long here.· The British
government. Palmerston concluded. had already made up its
mind not to entertain official intercourse with Confederate
emissaries, and the arrival of Mason and Slidell would do
nothing to alter its decision. The American minister, who
had already been in contact with the Captain of the James
Adger, informed Palmerston that the ship's mission was not
to capture the Confederate envoys but to take the Nashville,
a known Confederate blockade runner which just so hap-
pened to be carrying Mason and Slidell. However, having
been informed that the Confederate emissaries were not on
board the Nashville, which was nowhere in the vicinity of
England, the Captain intended to sail back to America.
This conversation with Adams did a good deal to allevi-
ate the prime minister's concerns over an American vessel
intercepting the newly appointed Confederate commission-
ers. On the same day as the Palmerston-Adams interview,
the Crown Law Officers, at the request of Palmerston, looked
into the legality of the potential seizure. Their conclusions
were as follows: United States naval officers had the right to
board a British mail ship, review its papers and mailbags, and
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take the ship for prize adjudication if found to be carrying
dispatches of the enemy. However, if Mason and Slidell were
removed and the ship was allowed to continue on its voyage
without being claimed as a prize, the seizure would be illegal
under international law. Of course, this final scenario was
precisely what occurred on November 8, however at the end
of November there were many issues that remained unclear
with regard to the Trent affair.
On November 29. after rushing back to his duties at the
American legation in London, Adams met with Earl Russell
who was searching for any information he could get on the
Trent matter. Adams, a little embarrassed by his own lack
of knowledge on the situation, told Russell "not a word had
been whispered· to him on the subject. The meeting lasted
only 10 minutes as it was obvious that Adams knew little
more than what was being reported in the London news-
papers, while Russell's dispatches from Lyons provided the
bulk of the foreign secretary's knowledge. Upon examining
the London newspapers the following day. Adams learned.
much to his chagrin, that the Crown's Law Officers had
"modified their opinion as I supposed, and now the dogs are
all let loose in the newspapers." The law officers had decided
that because Wilkes did not condemn the entire ship as a
prize. the capture of Mason and Slidell was unlawful and a
direct affront to the British fiag. "The tone now taken;' Ad-
ams sorrowfully recorded, "is of such a kind that I must make
up my mind to vacate this post some time in January." The
American minister was convinced that the Trent affair would
be the straw that broke the camel's back in Anglo-American
relations and prepared to arrange for his departure.
Immediately after his meeting with Adams on Decem-
ber 29, Russell attended a meeting of the cabinet to discuss
what should be done with regard to the Trent situation. The
cabinet members were outraged by the entire set of circum-
stances; they saw the facts as being that an American vessel
had forcefully boarded a neutral British mail packet, illegally
captured four of its passengers, and forfeited all claim to le-
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gality by not claiming the entire vessel as a prize. After sev-
eral tense meetings, the ministry adopted a dispatch to be
sent to Lyons that sought the immediate release of Mason,
Slidell, and their secretaries, along with a formal apology
from the United States government. It was decided that Ly-
ons would deliver these demands to the Lincoln administra-
tion, and if after one week it refused to make the necessary
reparations and offer a formal apology, the British minister
at Washington was to take his leave of America.
On November 30, the cabinet met to complete the dis-
patch that was to be sent to Lyons in Washington. Prince
Albert, husband of Queen Victoria and one of her most
trusted political advisers, had been informed by Chancellor
Gladstone of what the ministers planned to demand of the
United States. In what was the prince's final memorandum
(for he would collapse on December 2 and die on December
14), he suggested that a much more conciliatory tone be tak-
en towards the United States in the patch that Lyons would
present to Seward. The prime minister, upon reading the
Prince Albert's memo, wholeheartedly agreed, and the re-
sulting dispatch, containing the British demands for repara-
tions as well as the demand for a formal apology, reflected an
earnest desire to maintain the peaceful relations that marked
the relationship between America and Great Britain during
the past several decades, The final dispatch, written by Rus-
sell, gave an account of all the pertinent information of the
Trent case known to the British government and referred to
the seizure of Mason and Slidell as "an affront to the Brit~
ish flag and a violation of international law." However, the
British government was willing to believe that the Captain
of the San Jacincto had acted either without orders from the
United States government or had misinterpreted his orders.
For, the ministry believed, the American government was far
too wise to believe that Great Britain would allow such a fla-
grant offence go unnoticed. Surely, the dispatch continued,
the Lincoln administration realized that ~the British govern-
ment could not allow such an affront to the national honor
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to pass without full reparation." These reparations entailed
the release of the four prisoners incarcerated at Fort Warren
in Boston as well as "a suitable apology for the aggression
which has been committed,· If Secretary of State Seward
did not freely offer these terms to the British government,
via Lyons in Washington, the British minister to America
was to propose them to the secretary. These were the or-
ders that Lyons received in Washington in mid-December.
Upon their delivery to Seward, Lyons was to wait no more
than seven days for a reply, after which he was to demand his
passports from the American government.
As Russell's instructions to Lyons made their way across
the Atlantic, both the Palmerston ministry and Adams knew
that the reply would be a good deal of time in coming. Ap-
proximately four weeks would be needed just for the dis-
patches to make their way across the Atlantic and back to
London, and even if Lyons handed the demands to Seward
the day he received them the Lincoln administration still had
a week to deliberate upon them. This created a minimal five-
week interval for Adams to languish at the American lega-
tion in London knowing he was powerless to control the out~
come of the situation. This was in large part due to the fact
that Seward had suddenly ceased to provide his represen-
tative to the British government with any solid information
that Adams could have used to combat the mounting tide
of anti~American sentiment in England. Adams, however,
was doing all he could to keep his superiors in Washington
apprised of British public opinion, as well as what course the
Palmerston ministry was likely to pursue in the matter. ~The
pride of the British nation is deeply touched~ Adams wrote
to the secretary on November 29. In a separate dispatch
written on that same day, the Bostonian informed Seward
that the Crown's Law Officers had decided that by not seiz-
ing "papers and things~ Wilkes had forfeited his right to
seize persons on board the Trent. "In other words,· Adams
mused, "Great Britain would not have been offended if the
United States had insulted her a good deal more." Regard~
less, Adams told Seward that he believed the British govern-
ment would demand an apology and the release of Mason
and Slidell as reparations for the illegal act by Wilkes. The
American minister was certainly doing his job by providing
constant updates of the situation in London to the State De-
partment in Washington; however, in the American capital,
Seward grew strangely quiet with regard to what the govern-
ment was planning to do over the Trent issue.
Throughout December, Adams repeatedly lamented both
in his diary and letters to acquaintances that he was grossly
uninformed on the Trent affair and therefore could do little
to defend his government. When in early December the
liberal British M.P. for Yorkshire William E. Forster, the lead-
ing champion of the Northern cause in the House of Com-
mons, stopped by to see if there was anything he could learn
from Adams that could lessen the anti-American rhetoric in
England, the American minister was forced to confide that
he knew only what the newspapers were reporting. Adams
wrote bitterly to Seward on December ll, complaining of
a lack of information from the State Department on such a
dangerous and explosive issue. The American minister told
his superior that his dearth of intelligence on the Trent is-
sue placed him in "a predicament almost as awkward as if
I had not been commissioned here at all." Indeed, the only
dispatch that Adams received from Seward that provided
any intelligence on the Trent affair did not arrive until mid-
December and was hardly enough to allow Adams to form a
justification of the government's policy. Seward told Adams
that ~Captain Wilkes...acted without any instructions from
the government,~ leaving the Lincoln administration ~free
from the embarrassment~ that it would have incurred had
WLlkes been acting in accordance with orders issued from
Washington. The secretary accounted for the lack of infor-
mation from Washington as being necessary be<:ause the ad-
miniSlration wished to learn the British opinion on the mat-
ter before acting. Having hardly given Adams a sufficient
overview of the situation, Seward concluded the dispatch by
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telling Adams he would not object to the American minister
reading its contents to Russell.
After receiving Seward's dispatch on December 16, Ad-
ams immediately scheduled a meeting with Russell in order
to provide the Palmerston ministry with Seward's most re-
cent views of the situation. On Thursday, December 19, Ad-
ams met with the British foreign secretary in order to read
to him Seward's dispatch concerning the Trent affair. At a
three o'clock meeting in Russell's Downing Street office, Ad-
ams read word for word off the secretary's recently arrived
dispatch. He was sure to emphasize to Russell that Wilkes
had not acted under any orders (rom the United States gov-
ernment but had taken Mason and Slidell completely on
his own volition. Adams then asked the Englishman what
course the British government had opted to take. Russell
told Adams of the two dispatches that had been sent to Ly-
ons at the beginning of the month, the first with the Brit-
ish government's demands and the second giving the British
minister at Washington a one week interval for the Lincoln
administration to provide a reply. If this week was allowed to
pass without a proper answer, Russell continued, Lyons was
to proceed back to England, however this did not necessar-
ily imply that hostilities were a foregone conclusion. Much
would depend on the American answer, Russell indicated,
and Adams perceived that the ministry was not entirely de-
sirous of war with America despite the violent and threaten-
ing rhetoric emulating from the London press. For the first
time, Adams was beginning to feel that there could possibly
be a peaceful solution to the Trent issue.
Adams's newfound optimism in late December reflect-
ed his personal doubts about the wisdom of provoking the
world's greatest naval power at a time when America was
beset with its own internal difficulties. The American en-
voy to the Court of St. James, ever since he ficst heard the
news of Wilkes's actions in late November, was highly dubi-
ous about the legality of seizing Mason and Slidell, as well
as the precedent it might establish for future cases involving
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the United States. In a letter to John Motley, Adams point-
ed out that America had long been a champion of neutral
maritime rights. Thus, no matter how many precedents or
laws could be cited in America's favor, it would be difficult to
ignore British complaints because America might very well
some day find itself in the shoes Great Britain now stood in.
In a private letter to Seward in early December, Adams ac-
knowledged that a strong argument against Britain's claims
could be made and even based upon British treatment of
American neutral vessels in past conflicts. However, Ad-
ams saw little value in "varying from what seems to me so
honorable a record, under the temptation of a little ephem-
eral success....Our Neutral rights are as valuable to us as
they ever were whilst time has reflected nothing but credit
on our own steady defence [sic] of them against a superior
power.~ Only a little over two weeks since word first arrived
of the Trent affair in England, Adams warned the State De-
partment that preparations for war were rapidly progress-
ing in the British capital. Many Londoners, Adams wrote
to Seward, believed that America was pushing the limits of
Great Britain's patience, and the American minister urged
caution in Washington lest the Union bring Great Britain
into a de facto alliance with the Confederacy. It is obvious
from Adams's personal reflections, private correspondence,
and official dispatches to Washington that Adams, the direct
descendant of two American PreSidents, was not willing to
sit idly by as his government blundered into a third war with
Great Britain.
Adams's letters to Seward urging restraint and caution
arrived on the same vessel, the Europa, which carried a spe-
cial messenger, Captain c.c. Seymour, who was to deliver
to Lyons the British instructions. After receiving Russell's
instructions at 11:30 p.m. on December 18, Lyons paid a visit
to Seward the next day in order to unofficially communicate
to him the terms of the British demands. The secretary re-
quested that Lyons delay making the official presentation of
Russell's dispatch for two days, when on December 21 Seward
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would be ready to accept it and the seven days interval could
begin. Lyons agreed, and in a summary of the conversation
wrote to Russell that Seward "begged me to be assured that
he was very sensible of the friendly and conciliatory manner
in which~ Lyons had made the communication. However,
when Lyons appeared on Saturday, December 21 as Seward
had requested, the secretary again pleaded with the British
minister to allow him two more days before the official Brit-
ish ultimatum was delivered to the American government.
Lyons again acquiesced to Seward's appeal and thus made
the official presentation of the British government's demands
on Monday, December 23.
The Lincoln administration re<:eived plenty of advice
from outsiders on how to settle the Trent issue during the
month of December. From New York City, George Opdyke
wrote to the President, expressing his concern that Great
Britain would soon "commence hostilities" without a formal
declaration of war and pressing the president to upgrade
the city's defenses. Millard Fillmore urged the President
to avoid the "double calamities of civil and foreign war" by
making a "firm but conciliatory argument~ to any English
demands. Meanwhile, James Doolittle proposed to Lincoln
that the matter be brought before the Emperors of France
and Russia, "to determine the question whether upon the
law of nations we were not as belligerents justified in mak-
ing that arrest.~ The preSident himself was not entirely sure
how to approach the situation, and in his customary fashion
wrote out a memorandum on the subject that never saw the
light of day. In it, Lincoln wrote that if Russell's November
30 dispatch to Lyons was in fact correct and contained all
the "pertinent~ facts to the case, reparations to Great Britain
were indeed "justly due.~ The United States government,
Lincoln continued to himself, in no way meant to offend the
British flag or force Great Britain into dealing with this "em_
barrassing question.~ However, the Union government had
rights as well, and reparations should only be made when it
was proved that the act was "wrong, or, at least, very ques-
tionable.~ From this memorandum, it seems that Lincoln
was not willing to simply give in to the Palmerston ministry's
demands and might have even been considering taking the
matter before an international court.
The president, though not once making any reference to
his private memorandum, brought this viewpoint to a spe-
cial cabinet meeting called for Christmas Day, December
25. Despite this inclination to bring the matter for arbitra·
tion, the president and his cabinet were convinced by the
secretary of state that it was of the utmost importance to
acquiesce to the British demands without delay. Arbitration
would take months to play out, and it was obvious from Rus·
sell's dispatch to Lyons that the Palmerston ministry would
only give the administration one week to come to a deci-
sion on the matter. Furthermore, it had bet::ome evident
that America could expect no support from Europe on the
Trent matter. Seward came to the meeting bearing in mind
Adams's warnings from earlier in the month. The secretary's
London representative had offered up several cogent points
to the matter, not the least of which was the precedent it
would establish for future cases. Moreover, Adams's warn-
ings concerning war preparations in the British capital must
have had a profound effect upon Seward and the rest of the
cabinet, who were not oblivious to the fact that America
would be incredibly hard pressed to fight a war against Great
Britain coinciding with a struggle against the Southern reb-
els. Facing this daunting possibility, the cabinet agreed that
Seward would draft a dispatch to Russell in which the secre-
tary would meet the British foreign minister's demands.
Seward's reply to the British demand for the release of
Mason and Slidell, completed the day after the Christmas
morning cabinet meeting, was a comprehensive summary
of WHkes's actions and an analysis of their legality. Seward
informed the British government that it had ~rightly con·
jectured~ that Wtlkes had ~acted upon his own suggestions
of duty, without any direction or instructions or even fore-
knowledge of it, on the part of this government,~ thus reliev-
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ing the government itself from all responsibility for the ac·
lOal seizure. Seward pointed out several facts which Russell
had neglected to include in his November 30 set ofdemands,
namely that the four captured men were ~pretended com·
missioners~ sent by a ~pretended~ president, Jefferson Da-
vis, to Great Britain and France in order to persuade those
nations into recognizing the insurgent authorities at Rich-
mond. The men were also carrying ~pretended credentials
and instructions, and such papers are in the law known as
dispatches.~ Therefore, Wilkes's actions should be seen ~as a
simple legal and customary belligerent proceeding,~ instead
of~a merely flagrant act ofviolence,~ as they were portrayed
in England.
The secretary of state put forward five questions relative
to the seizure of Mason and Slidell: I) Were Mason, Slidell,
and their dispatches contraband of war? 2) Did Wilkes have
the lawful right to stop and search for Mason, Slidell, and
their dispatches? 3) Did Wilkes exercise that right of search
in a lawful and proper manner? 4) Did Wdkes have the right
to capture Mason and Slidell? 5) Was the right of capture
exercised in accordance with the law of nations? If all five of
these questions could be answered in the affirmative. Seward
continued, then Great Britain would have no right to claim
reparations. After answering the first four questions with
a ~Yes; the Secretary took up the last and most important
question. Did Wilkes exercise the right ofcapture according
to the guidelines of international law? For if he did not. then
questions one through four would become irrelevant. and
Great Britain would be fully entitled to the reparations which
it sought. Seward concluded that by not taking the Trent to
prize court for adjudication, Wilkes had ~prevented the judi·
cia! examination which might otherwise have occurred~ in
the affair. The Captain had voluntarily given up his claim
to a legitimate capture, just as the Crown's Law Officers had
decided in November and just as Adams had surmised in
his dispatches to Seward in early December. ~l have fallen
into an argument against my own country; Seward wrote,
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"but I am relieved from all embarrassment on the subject:'
Mason, Slidell. and their secretaries "will be cheerfully lib-
erated,~ Seward concluded, once Lyons named a time and
place {or their departure.
Upon receiving the secretary's note on the morning of
December 27, Lyons immediately sent a dispatch to Russell,
informing the foreign secretary, "I consider that the demands
of Her Majesty's Government are so far substantially com-
plied with ...and [will] remain at my post until I receive fur-
ther orders~ After several days of debating where the most
suitable place-would be for the prisoners to depart without
causing a violent scene, it was decided that the small Mas-
sachusetts town of Provincetown would provide the ideal
location. On January 3, in a brief dispatch to RusselL Lyons
was able to inform his superior in London that ~Mr. Mason
and Mr. Slidell and their two companions sailed from Prov-
incetown on board Her Majesty's ship Rinaldo at five o'clock
the day before yesterday: Although poor weather would
prevent their arrival in England until January 30, the four
ex-captives were free from their nearly two month long im-
prisonment. More importantly, war with Great Britain had
been averted by the Lincoln administration.
The news of the diplomatic settlement reached London
officially on January 8. The word quickly spread like wildfire
throughout England, causing church bells to be rung, the-
ater audiences to burst into applause, and buoyant Britons
to congratulate themselves on having avoided a war with
America. Adams, though slightly less jubilant than his Eng-
lish counterparts, nevertheless recorded in his journal that
"the danger of war is for the present removed. I am to re-
main in this purgatory a while longer.w His tone was modi-
fied the next day when, upon reading Seward's dispatch, he
believed that ~traces of my dispatchW from early December
could be found in the secretary's decision. Two days later,
Russell showed Adams a copy of a dispatch he intended to
send to Lyons, accepting the American reply. The American
minister responded by reflecting that he was "very glad this
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was so well settled," to which Russell assented ~in the same
view, and hoped that nothing was left in the way of contin-
ued peace~ between the two nations.
/Adams was correct in his belief that Seward had paid
close attention to his warnings in early December. Even
though Adams felt slighted by the lack of information he re-
ceived from Washington, he had performed more than ably
in keeping his superiors informed of the public and political
sentiment pervading throughout Great Britain in the wake
of the Trent news. Furthermore, Adams's astute remarks
about creating precedents, which in the future could do more
harm than good to America, were not ignored by the secre-
tary of state. In Washington, Seward and Lyons both did a
good deal to preserve peaceful relations between America
and Great Britain. Lyons's forbearance in officially present-
ing Seward with the British ultimatum allowed the Secretary
to develop a more forceful argument against rejecting the
British demands. Seward himself deserves commendation
for realizing that America had to submit to Great Britain's
demands in order to avoid a war with the world's most
powerful nation, despite cries from Congress and cabinet
members that Mason and Slidell should never be released.
While it will never be known what would have happened
had Seward and Adams been unable to convince the cabi-
net and the president to accede to the British government's
claims, public sentiment had been so aroused in England as
to quite possibly make further relations between the two na-
tions impossible. Adams, for one, dearly believed that if his
government did not satisfactorily comply with Russell's No-
vember 30 dispatch to Lyons, his presence in London would
be of no further use. Although he was not entirely convinced
that war would necessarily follow an American refusal, Ad-
ams realized that the Lincoln administration could ill afford
to incur even the diplomatic wrath of Great Britain when
America was in such a state of internal turmoil. Thus, while
unable to in any way alter the Palmerston ministry's actions
in London, Adams was able to influence Seward's actions in
Washington through his private and diplomatic correspon-
dence with the Secretary. At a time when patriotic fervor
ran rampant through both capitols, the American minister
to Great Britain put aside all such emotion and passion in
order to rationally argue against what could have caused a
devastating breach in Anglo-American relations.
The Trent affair was the low water mark of Anglo-Ameri-
can relations in 1861 and almost led to a trans-Atlantic con-
flict that quite possibly would have ruined any hopes the lin-
coln administration had of restoring the Union. Its successful
resolution, due in no small part to Adams's warnings and
advice from London, allowed the Union to momentarily put
foreign matters on the back burner and focus on stepping up
its war effort against the Confederacy. As 1862 progressed
and the Union naval and land forces recorded numerous vic-
tories, it became clear that Great Britain would nOl intervene
in the Civil War so long as hope remained for a Northern
military victory. In late January, Adams reflected upon the
settlement of the Trent affair as having staved off British at-
tempts at interference in America's domestic matters. -The
army will have time to determine the question; Adams gladly
recorded in his diary. Indeed, when news reached London
of the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson in early March, along
with the Battle of Pea Ridge later in the month, Adams noted
the upswing in pro-Unionism throughout the British capital.
-Nothing shines so dazzling to the military eye of Europe as
success; Adams wrote. -Our English friends appreciate it as
fully as any body.· At a dinner party in early March, Adams
~was congratulated all around· by newfound well·wishers of
the Union. -Even Lord PaImerston seemed to doubt his for-
mer judgment; Adams cheerfully noted. The first half of
1862 was indeed an extraordinary one for Northern forces,
and news continued to pour into England of the Union's mil-
itary prowess. Late April and early May were filled with talk
of the Battle of Shiloh; on May 11, Adams received word of
the capture of New Orleans by Union forces under Admiral
David Farragut; two weeks later, the capture of Norfolk was
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the talk of the town in London; early June witnessed news of
the rebels being -driven out of Corinth."
Of course, the Union did see its share of military failures
in 1862, perhaps none worse than the rout of soldiers un-
der General John Pope at the Battle of Second Bull Run in
late August. In September and October, the British cabinet,
led by foreign secretary Russell, seemed to move ever closer
towards offering recognition to the Confederacy and the
results of the second defeat of Union forces near Manassas
Junction, Virginia served to lend further weight towards a call
for an armistice followed by recognition of the Confederacy.
However, as the intervention clamor reached a peak in the
Palmerston ministry in November 1862, British secretary for
war George Cornewall Lewis cited historical precedents in
order to justify non-intervention and was able to dissuade
Earl Russell from recognizing the Confederacy. Palmerston
also remained cautious in meddJing with American affairs
and never truly supported fuJI-fledged recognition of the
rebels during the 1862 intervention crisis. Despite initial
doubt over the outcome of the Battle of Antietam, Septem-
ber 17, 1862, Englishmen ultimately realized that the battle
was a turning point in the American war. Similarly, initial
hostility towards the Emancipation Proclamation, viewed by
many in England as a desperate attempt to incite a servile
insurrection in the South, eventually gave way to acceptance
of the measure as a vital step in the fight against slavery.
While it was not clear to contemporaries, the autumn and
early winter of 1862 ended any serious hopes that the Con-
federacy had for British intervention or recognition.
Although 1862 may have seen Great Britain teeter on the
brink of intervention. 1861 was one of the most strenuous
years in Anglo-American relations since the two nations had
been engaged in battle almost fifty years prior. Almost as
soon as the Lincoln administration stepped into office it was
forced to deal with British recognition of Confederate bel·
ligerent rights. Even before the newly appointed minister to
Great Britain had arrived in London, the British foreign sec·
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retary was meeting with Confederate emissaries and hearing
their pleas (or recognition in early May. Negotiations be-
!:Ween the two countries over neutral rights. which by their
nature should have created a more amicable friendship, met
with complete failure and served only to enlarge the sense
of mistrust being built up on both sides of the Atlantic. The
British dependence upon Southern cotton turned the block-
ade and port closures measures into divisive issues between
the two nations throughout the year. A minor dispute over
the actions of the British consul at Charleston threatened to
erupt at any moment throughout the fall of 1861 into a ma-
jor quarrel. British participation in the Mexican interven-
tion caused many Northerners to fear that Great Britain was
growing bolder about possibly making its presence known
on American soil. Finally, the Trent affuir, in and of itself
merely a minor violation of international law by an ambitious
Captain in the United States Navy, led to war preparations
in London and narrowly missed causing the third conflict in
less than a century between America and Great Britain.
AJI of these disagreements, misunderstandings, and dis·
putes were the direct results of the underlying issues between
America and Great Britain in the first year of the Civil War.
However much Adams and others wished for emancipation
to come about in the early stages of the conflict, the Lincoln
administration was initially unwilling to make slavery an is-
sue at home or abroad. The British belief that separation
between the North and South was inevitable allowed Russell
to hold talks (even if they were -unofficial~)with Southern
envoys, and led the Union government to believe that rec·
ognition of the Confederacy was not far off. The Queen's
Proclamation of Neutrality, despite Russell's legitimate claim
that it was a purely domestic measure, confirmed this belief
to many in the North who viewed it as merely a precursor
to formal recognition. Seward's insistence that the Union
government be treated as the only government in America
led to the debacle over the Bunch affuir because the secre-
tary was unwilling to accept that a British consul had entered
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into negotiations with the Richmond authorities, no matter
how necessary such negotiations were for the British gov-
ernment. The Palmerston ministry's mistrust of Seward led
to the collapse of the Declaration of Paris negotiations when
Russell insisted upon inserting a clause to the agreement
that was unacceptable to the Americans. The Union's mili-
tary woes in 1861, particularly its complete rout in the first
major battle of the war, substantiated the opinions of men
like Russell and Gladstone who believed the North could not
bring the South back into the Union and that Southern in·
dependence was indeed a fait accompli. Many Northerners
saw the Mexican intervention as a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine and a direct challenge to America's power in the
Western Hemisphere. Moreover, Adams represented many
in the Union in his belief that Europe was taking advantage
of America's internal turmoil in order to reestablish itself in
North America via the Mexican expedition. The year cul-
minated in the Trent affuir. which brought every source of
mistrust between the two countries to life and exposed the
vulnerability of two governments who had assumed such
vastly differing positions in the earliest stages of America's
Civil War.
In the end, fortunately, both nations stepped back from
the edge of destruction that war between them would have
brought and cast aside their previous slights in order to reach
a diplomatic (and relatively simple) compromise. The value
of diplomacy for this period of American history cannot be
overestimated; although the incompatibility of American
and British interests in the Civil War threatened to destroy
civility between the two countries, sound and rationalized
diplomacy on the part of men such as Adams, Seward, Ly-
ons, and Russell helped to stave off what could have been the
ultimate demise to Anglo-American relations. Adams. in
particular. was able to cast aside the intense patriotism that
came naturally to him as the son and grandson of American
Presidents in order to calculate what was in the end best for
his country regardless of popular opinion or short-term con-
sequences. Whether this was accomplished through a smaIl
act such as dressing in silk and lace to please British high
society at the Court of St. James or an enormous decision
like urging his government to ignore public sentiment and
abide by the British demands during the Trent affair, Adams
always sought what was most beneficial for America in his
first year in London. Although the end of 1861 by no means
signified the end of difficulties in the relationship between
America and Great Britain during the Civil War. Adams's
success in maintaining a stable, civilized connection between
the governments of both nations was a vital contribution to
the Union's diplomacy during the Civil War.
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